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INTRODUCTION
RICO is an easy statute to love or hate; it is not an easy statute to
figure out.' Its intricate interplay of criminal and civil provisions has created
a jurisprudence in which "out-come determinative legal standards remain
shrouded in uncertainty." '2 On almost every substantive issue, one circuit's
°* B.A. Haverford College, M.A. University of Virginia, J.D. University of Virginia,
LL.M. Columbia University. Thanks go to Jed Rakoff for his inspirational seminar at
Columbia, and to Joan Meir for her thoughtful critique of an earlier draft.
1. "RICO" stands for "Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," which is
the heading of title IX of Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968). Cf. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Racketeering Made Simple(r), in Ti RICO RACKET
1-14 (Gary L. McDowell ed., 1989); L. Gordon Crovitz, RICO: The Legalized Extortion and
Shakedown Racket, in Ti RICO RACKET, supra, at 14-31.
2. Gregory P. Joseph, Circuits In Disarray on Six Key Issues, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26,
1992, at 17.
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decision receives another's derision. Nor has the Supreme Court been able
to help. Although it has taken a consistently expansionist approach to
RICO, constantly giving broad readings to RICO's terms and repeatedly
rejecting lower court efforts to narrow the statute's scope, this has not
reduced circuit court conflict.
3
On March 3, 1993, however, the Court abruptly departed from its
expansionist method to accept a narrow reading of RICO liability in Reves
v. Ernst & Young.4 While the decision itself may be salutary, the grounds
upon which it rests are not. The Court's reliance on word-chopping simply
does not provide lower courts adequate guidance to navigate through the
forest of thorny RICO issues that remain. 5 Judge Mikva of the D.C. Circuit
captured the essence of the problem when, questioning his colleagues'
attempt to narrow RICO's scope similarly to the Supreme Court's narrowing
in Reves, he asked "Why is one element of the statute properly deemed
broad while another read narrowly?"6 The Supreme Court did not answer
this question in Reves. This Article tries.
This Article develops a rationale for the decision reached in Reves that
may help resolve other issues that arise because of the interplay between
RICO's civil and criminal provisions. My thesis is that RICO should be
interpreted narrowly in some cases and broadly in others, depending on the
nature of the issue before the court. The suggested method of interpretation
does no more than recognize and apply the fact that RICO has both a
remedial and punitive purpose to it. These dual purposes support the use
of a dual construction doctrine to resolve statutory ambiguity and answer
Judge Mikva's question. The thesis is supported by logic, policy, legislative
history, and over 100 years of state and federal court precedent.
Section I will briefly set out RICO's structure, examine how and why
RICO has been so broadly interpreted, and explain the profound effect
such indiscriminate expansionist interpretation has had on private civil
litigation. Section II will present Reves as a case in point and show how
the Reves opinion departs from the approach of previous decisions without
articulating a principled basis for doing so. Section III will outline and
defend my thesis that the dual construction doctrine provides a principled
basis for statutory interpretation that will also help reduce the perceived
abuse of private civil RICO.
3. E.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (criticizing Court's broad interpretation for having "created a kaleidoscope of
circuit positions."); 1 MATHEWS ET AL., CVIL RICO LITIGATION 1-16 (2d ed. 1992) ("The
variations between the positions taken by the courts on issues arising under the statute are
usually so fundamental and widespread that it takes a Supreme Court decision to resolve them.
But RICO issues, like heads of the beast Hydra, proliferate from these decisions.").
4. 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).
5. See e.g., Joseph, supra note 2, at 17 (identifying statute of limitations issues,
investment-use injury, mens rea requirements, availability of punitive damages, and need for
economic motivation as unresolved questions).
6. Yellow Bus v. Drivers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Mikva,




RICO is codified among the criminal laws of the United States, in 18
U.S.C. section 1961 et seq. Roughly speaking, it creates four separate crimes
in section 1962, each defined in terms of how something called a "pattern
of racketeering activity" relates to something else called an "enterprise."
Section 1962(a) prohibits the investment of proceeds from a pattern of
racketeering activity into an enterprise. Section 1962(b) prohibits acquiring
or maintaining an interest in an enterprise by a pattern of racketeering
activity. Section 1962(c) prohibits conducting the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. Finally, section 1962(d) prohibits
conspiracy to commit any of the above three crimes.
The terms used in creating the section 1962 crimes are defined (some-
what) in section 1961. The clearest term, "racketeering activity," is simply
the violation of any of a laundry list of various crimes-also called predicate
acts-catalogued in section 1961(1). For example, murder is on the list but
adultery is not; mail fraud is there, but violation of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act is absent. No actual prior conviction of predicate acts is
necessary; it suffices to act in a manner that is "chargeable" or "indicta-
ble. 1"
The statute does not say what a "pattern" is, but says that it "requires
at least two acts of racketeering activity." 8 Nor does the statute define
"enterprise" except to say that it "includes" all individuals and legal entities
as well as "any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity." 9
The same provisions and terms that form the basis of criminal liability
also form the basis for civil suits via section 1964(c), a provision added at
the last moment by the House, with little discussion in the House and no
discussion in the Senate.10 It reads, in full:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Thus, as this cursory introduction to RICO's basic structure demonstrates,
the same key terms and relationships created by section 1962 will require
application in both the civil context, where nonfederal plaintiffs may sue,
and in the criminal context, whenever the federal government chooses to
prosecute.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
8. Id. § 1961(5).
9. Id. § 1961(4).
10. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 507 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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B. The Expansion of RICO
RICO was intended to strike a new balance of power between organized
crime and the government in a specific way." However, the statute, both
as written and as interpreted, goes far beyond that intent. Through what
Gerald Lynch convincingly shows to be a "logic of expansion," the language
Congress chose to implement its (relatively) narrowly defined objective-
rooting out the Mafia and like organizations from the channels of legitimate
commerce-has ended up defining and severely punishing almost any non-




It is generally acknowledged that the authors of RICO and its prede-
cessor bills wanted to create a specialized tool for prosecutors to combat a
monster called "Organized Crime."' 3 The special tool was to enable pro-
secutors to root out the monster's perceived rising influence over, and
infiltration of, legitimate business and governmental enterprises. 4 Such
infiltration subverted democratic processes and resulted in corrupt and
racketeer-influenced organizations gaining an unfair competitive advantage
over legitimate businesses.' 5 Moreover, the monster was outstripping the
sanctions and remedies then available to the government, most notably the
mail and wire fraud statutes.' 6 While some prosecutors could play those
statutes like a Stradivarius, their puny penalties allowed Organized Crime's
top brass to tune them out when conducting business. The monster kept
dodging the bullet, throwing the government curves, and devouring more
and more legitimate businesses and unions faster than the government could
cook up new ways to use the mall and wire fraud statutes against them.'
11. I take much of my interpretive structure from Gerald Lynch's excellent article RICO:
The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 CoLum. L. REv. 661 (1987) [hereinafter
RICO], from Marshall's powerful dissent in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
500 (1985), and from Judge Oake's thoughtful panel opinion in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984).
12. RICO, supra note 11, at 662-64.
13. See generally the preface to the Organized Crime Control Act, 116 CONG. REc. 602
(1970), quoted in Crovitz, supra note 1.
14. Lynch demonstrates that the Congressional purpose was limited to rooting out
Organized Crime's infiltration of legitimate organizations, RICO, supra note 11, at 673-80,
refuting the contention of Blakey and Gettings that RICO was specifically intended to attack
criminal enterprises. See G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009
(1980).
15. Crovitz, supra note 1.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. IV 1992).
17. Cf. Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DuQ. L. Rav. 771
(1980) ("To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius,
our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true love.").
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The essential drafting difficulty was finding a constitutional method of
defining "Organized Crime." The drafters deliberately chose not to explicitly
outlaw membership in organized criminal syndicates, such as the Mafia,
because of the perceived constitutional problems of making "status" a crime
and of defining just what constituted an "organized criminal syndicate."'"
Instead, "in an attempt to ensure the constitutionality of the statute,
Congress made [its] central proscription the use of a 'pattern of racketeering
activities' in connection with an 'enterprise." ' 9 In other words, unable to
define what were "organized criminal syndicates," and then outlaw mem-
bership in them, Congress turned to an operational definition of "Organized
Crime," and tried to get at the criminal syndicate through its activity.
The operational definition, however, is much broader than necessary to
capture either Congressional intent or mafioso. This was recognized by the
drafters:
It is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches most of
the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include
offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime
as well. 20
What was not recognized by the drafters, at least explicitly, was that while
neither they nor the prosecutors who would implement the criminal provi-
sions had much interest in pursuing commercial activity offenses committed
by persons outside organized crime,2' civil plaintiffs would have a great
deal of interest in doing so. And the private civil remedies provision, thrown
in as an after-thought, provided both encouragement and a means to express
that interest in court.
Though a logical response to a legitimate drafting difficulty, the oper-
ational definition put the "potent" in the statute's potential to reach far
beyond "Organized Crime" to mere "organized criminals"-those who
commit the predicate acts in such a way as to constitute a "pattern"-and
from there to organized businessmen. Even though the record clearly shows
that Congress intended to accomplish no more than "stamp[] out the
organized crime parasites preying upon our society,'"'2 there is no record
of how Congress expected its statute to be limited to that objective.
18. See, e.g., Task Force on Civil RICO of the Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law of the American Bar Association, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc RICO TASK FORCE
71 (1985) [hereinafter Task Force on Civil RICOJ.
19. Id.
20. 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan), quoted in H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989).
21. See also Task Force on Civil RICO, supra note 18, at 70-71 ("The reach of the
statute beyond traditional mobster and racketeer activity and comparable ongoing structured
criminal enterprises, was intended to be incidental and only to the extent necessary to maintain
the constitutionality of a statute aimed primarily at organized crime.") (footnote omitted).
22. Remarks of Sen. McClellen, 115 CONG. REc. 9,568 (1969), quoted in RICO, supra
note 11, at 680 n.97.
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2. As Interpreted
The Congressional wish for a far-reaching RICO has been the Supreme
Court's command. The Court's interpretation of certain key terms and its
rejections of proposed limitations on RICO have fully realized RICO's
extraordinarily broad potential.
First, United States v. Turkette,23 a criminal case, established that the
term "enterprise," as defined by section 1961, includes entities wholly
engaged in criminal activity. For example, a group of people who work
together to buy property, fraudulently over-insure it, and then burn it to
collect the insurance, constitute an "enterprise" that could, in violation of
section 1962(c), be conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity.24
In so deciding, the Court rejected the narrower possibility that the term
"enterprise" meant merely legitimate enterprises and not criminal ones.
Second, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,21 a private civil case, overturned
a circuit court's attempt to narrow RICO's application. Sedima concerned
the meaning of section 1964(c)'s grant of a private civil remedy to any
person harmed "by reason of a violation of" section 1962. While expressing
concern over "the consequences of an unbridled reading of the statute," 26
the Court nonetheless rejected two potential limiting constructions: (1) that
the phrase required a prior criminal conviction and (2) that the statute
compensated only "racketeering injury," that is, damages caused by the
"pattern" of racketeering activity itself, as distinct from the harms caused
by the underlying predicate acts that constituted the racketeering activity.
Finally, in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,27 another
private civil RICO case, the Court borrowed a phrase from the legislative
history to define the term "pattern" as "continuity plus relationship" which
it held meant (1) the predicate acts must constitute or threaten long-term
criminal activity (more than "a few weeks or months") 2 and (2) the
predicate acts must be related to each other, either by having the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission,
or by having any other relationship that shows that they "are not isolated
events." 29 This is pretty broad. Basically, the Court warns that committing
two predicate acts in a non-random fashion during a period of more than
a few months may result in RICO violations.
To some, this is also pretty vague. Justice Scalia, for example, sharply
criticized the majority's "continuity plus relationship" test as a "talismanic
phrase" that was "about as helpful ... as 'life is a fountain"'30 in
23. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
24. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-87 (1981).
25. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
26. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985).
27. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
28. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242 (1989).
29. Id. at 240 (quoting the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 1001(a), § 3575(e), 84 Stat. 922, 950 (repealed 1984)).
30. Id. at 252.
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determining what conduct RICO reaches, and bluntly suggested that "pat-
tern" was unconstitutionally vague.' However, most courts appear to have
concluded that "this may be broad, but it is not vague; ' 32 almost every
court to consider the issue has upheld its constitutionality.
33
As in Turkette and Sedima, the Court in H.J. deliberately declined to
narrow the "pattern" element of RICO. It rejected the lower court's
narrower interpretation of "pattern" as meaning two or more "schemes,"
concluding that "pattern" was "a concept of sufficient breadth that it
might encompass multiple predicates within a single scheme that were related
and that amounted to, or threatened the likelihood of, continued criminal
activity. '' 4
3. The Logic of Expansion
The logic behind this expansionist jurisprudence can be traced through
each of the above opinions. A presumption based on the statute's structure
and legislative history becomes a rule of construction based on a liberal
interpretation clause, which is then applied to both civil and criminal cases
alike. The steps add up to a reasonable and logically consistent approach.
The Turkette Court read the language and history of the statute to
create a presumption that sections 1961 and 1962 must be read broadly.
Because the term under consideration (enterprise) had not been explicitly
defined by Congress, the Court's search for the "plain" meaning of the
term necessarily involved an analysis of the purpose and structure of the
statute. The Court eventually settled on a broad meaning because "neither
the language nor structure of RICO limits [RICO's] application to 'legitimate
enterprises." '' 35 Six pages of the opinion are devoted to demonstrating how
31. Id. at 255-56.
32. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Although Judge
Pierce was commenting on the "participate ... in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise"
language, and not the "pattern" requirement, his comment seems equally apropos here.
33. Courts have rejected both facial challenges and, more commonly, because defendants
rarely have standing to assert facial challenges, as-applied challenges, both by organized crime
entities and other types of entities. See United States v. Eisenberg, 773 F. Supp. 662, 728-731
(D.N.J. 1991) (rejecting both facial and as applied challenges brought by non-organized crime
entity brokerage firm). The Eisenberg court collected the cases, concluding that "courts ...
have uniformly rejected the challenges, with one exception." Id. at 731. See also United States
v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1104 (3d Cir. 1990), where the court rejected the vagueness
challenge, holding that as applied, the particular defendant was put sufficiently on notice that
multiple acts of murder and extortion would subject him to RICO penalties. The one exception
is Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556, 1581 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (dismissing civil RICO
count as unconstitutional application and finding RICO to be unconstitutional on its face),
aff'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circuit, however, chided the
district judge for doing so, holding that dismissal of the RICO counts did not require any
constitutional judgments and emphasizing that "we expressly distance ourselves from the
district court's holding in that respect." Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279, 286 (6th Cir.
1992).
34. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989).
35. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
1994]
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the expansive definition of "enterprise" was enabled by the legislative
history, even though not expressly addressed by it.16 The opinion is full of
phrases such as: "In view of the purposes and goals of the Act, as well as
the language of the statute, we are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless
confined the reach of the law to ... only the infiltration of legitimate
business. ' 37 In short, when confronted with more than one reasonable
definition of a term, the Court used its expansionist presumption, derived
from its reading of legislative history, to put the burden on those who
favored the narrower definition to prove that the narrower definition was
specifically contemplated by Congress.
What was a presumption in Turkette for interpreting sections 1961 and
1962 became a rule in Sedima for interpreting section 1964. In Sedima the
Court added RICO's liberal construction clause to its list of reasons for
interpreting section 1964 expansively because that clause provides that RICO
"shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." 3 The
Court went again to the legislative history and, as in Turkette, found that
the issue before the Court had not been "anticipated" by Congress.39 Despite
that, the Court chose the "less restrictive reading" of section 1964, because
of the "general principles surrounding this statute," because of "Congress'
self-consciously expansive language and overall approach," (citing Turkette)
and mostly because of the "express admonition" contained in the liberal
construction clause.4°
The liberal construction rule presumed in Turkette and announced in
Sedima has been applied equally in both civil and criminal contexts.4'
Although the Sedima opinion suggests at one point that the criminal
sections-section 1962 (defining the four new crimes) and section 1961 (de-
fining the terms used in section 1962)-could be strictly construed while the
civil section-section 1964-at issue in Sedima could be liberally construed, 42
36. Id. at 588-93.
37. Id. at 590 (first emphasis added). Other examples in the Court's opinion of its
expansionist presumption are: "Considering this statement of the Act's broad purposes, the
construction of RICO suggested by respondent and the court below is unacceptable." Id. at
589. "The language of the statute . . . reveals that Congress [intended a broad] definition of
the word 'enterprise,' and we are unconvinced by anything in the legislative history that this
definition should be given less than its full effect." Id. at 593 (emphasis supplied). "But
[Congress] did nothing to indicate that an enterprise ... was not covered by RICO if the
purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal." Id. at 581.
38. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922,
947 (1970).
39. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
40. Id. at 497-98 (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983), in which the Court
supported its broad interpretation of RICO in a criminal case by observing that "terms and
concepts of breadth" were "the pattern of the RICO statute." The Court also applied the
liberal construction clause in this criminal context, noting that, so far as it knew, "this is the
only substantive federal criminal statute that contains such a directive." Id. at 27.
42. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491-92 n.10.
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the Court has never used that distinction. Sedima itself states the rule
categorically: "RICO is to be read broadly.
'43
The final logical step, of course, has been to use civil cases as precedent
for criminal and vice versa. Just as the Court makes no distinction between
civil and criminal interpretations of RICO, so the Court uses a mix-and-
match approach to precedent. For example, the Sedima court cited the
Turkette decision for the proposition that Congress "wanted to reach both
'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises." 44 As demonstrated above, Con-
gress was not that specific.41 It is in this fashion that the Court itself expands
Congressional intent. The Court has also claimed that the established broad
precedents compel it to continue its expansive readings. For example, the
Court built its holding in H.J. upon Sedima's broad base, explaining at
one point that "[iut would be counterproductive and a mismeasure of
congressional intent now to adopt a narrow construction of the statute's
pattern element that would require proof of an organized crime nexus."
46
For these reasons, the Court has steadily constructed and followed the
expansionist road. While doing so may have well effectuated the obvious
ambition of the statute's drafters, such expansion has also worked a
disturbing transformation in private litigation that Congress never expressly
considered during the last-minute, rushed addition of section 1964(c)'s pri-
vate civil remedy.
C. Problems Created by the Interplay of Civil and Criminal RICO
The chief "abuse;' of RICO complained of by courts and commentators
is that thousands of civil plaintiffs have abandoned traditional state law
and common-law fraud remedies for the glittering allure of RICO treble
damages and attorney fees awards, when there is no reason to believe that
the former remedies were inadequate. 47 Through RICO, civil plaintiffs seek
extraordinary remedies for ordinary business disputes through the fortuity
that commission of the same predicate acts set out in section 1962(c) may
result in either criminal or civil liability. Three features of RICO contribute
to this phenomenon.
First, commission of mail and wire fraud is defined as "racketeering
activity." The range of activity that may constitute mail and wire fraud is
so great that "[a]n aggrieved party can describe most kinds of commercial
dispute as some species of fraud, and, therefore, given the ubiquity of the
43. Id. at 497.
44. Id. at 499.
45. This distinction may be best appreciated by parents of young children who often use
the same trick of equating parental silence with parental blessing. Thus, because the parents
may clearly want their child to eat "dinner" but neglect to define precisely what they mean
by "dinner," the child will claim that the parents "wanted" him to eat the package of Oreos.
46. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989).
47. See generally Norman Abrams, A New Proposal For Limiting Private Civil RICO,
37 UCLA L. Rav. 1, 4 (1989) (stating that approximately 1000 RICO cases are filed each
year).
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mails and interstate wire communications, as mail or wire fraud. ' 48 Indeed,
one study has found that almost forty-five percent of all private civil RICO
actions ever filed have alleged the "racketeering activity" to be what would
otherwise have been common-law fraud.
49
Prior to RICO, mail and wire fraud were exclusively criminal acts and
did not create private causes of action. Although in theory it is not difficult
to prosecute mail and wire fraud cases, in practice two constraints have
limited federal prosecutors from doing so. First, as repeat players before a
single court, prosecutors have an incentive to voluntarily police their be-
havior in order to create and maintain a good reputation. Second, limited
resources discourage potential abuse. While reliance on prosecutorial dis-
cretion may appear odd to some, judges have explicitly acknowledged their
belief that the "prudent use of prosecutorial discretion' 15 has reserved use
of those statutes to especially pernicious or novel types of fraud.12 One
commentator implies that judicial confidence in prosecutors and the desire
to allow them as wide a latitude as possible to combat new forms of fraud
has contributed to the expansive judicial interpretations of the mail and
wire fraud statutes since 1909.51
In contrast, private litigants lack the incentives to refrain from stretching
the statutes to their considerable limits; neither they nor their attorneys may
appear often before any one court, and the prospect of treble damages and
attorney's fees ameliorates a large part of the resources problem. The result
has been a flood of lawsuits attempting to turn "garden variety" civil fraud
cases into RICO cash crops,5 4 as plaintiff lawyers go "theory shopping"
simply to obtain the treble damage award.5 5 Although courts can dismiss
either a civil or criminal RICO charge as unconstitutional as applied to a
48. Gerald E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide To RICO Reform,
43 VAND. L. REV. 769, 795 (1990).
49. MATHEWS ET AL., supra note 3, at 1-3. Securities fraud presents a similar problem
to mail and wire fraud. Lynch, supra note 48, at 795. When you add in the common-law
fraud and securities fraud cases together, over 75% of private civil RICO cases are properly
characterized as ordinary business disputes.
50. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 502.
52. Id. at 502-03. See generally Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I),
18 DUQ. L. REV. 771 (1980). It is interesting that in 1984 both the majority and dissent in
Sedima complain about the extensive use of the mail fraud statutes in civil RICO cases. See
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500, 501. Two terms later, in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350
(1987), the Court gave what appears to be its first restrictive interpretation of the mail and
wire fraud statutes, only to have Congress legislatively reinsert what the Court had judicially,
if not judiciously, taken out. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988)).
53. Rakoff, supra note 52, at 772 (stating that mail fraud statutes have "been charac-
terized as the 'first line of defense' against virtually every new area of fraud to develop in the
United States in the past century.").
54. See cases collected in MATHEWS ET AL., supra note 3, at 1-23 n.46.
55. Robert K. Rasmussen, Introductory Remarks and a Comment on Civil RICO's
Remedial Provisions, 43 VAND. L. REV. 623, 629 (1990).
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particular defendant, few courts are willing to narrow RICO's reach on the
civil side when to do so would clearly go against congressional intent on
the criminal side.5 6 In sum, as Justice (then Judge) Kennedy explained:
[t]he potential range of ... the federal mail and wire fraud laws
is vast, made so in part by expansive judicial interpretation....
The reach of those statutes exists against a backdrop of prosecutorial
discretion, however, discretion which, if sensitively exercise, operates
as a check to the improvident exertion of federal power. No such
check operates in the civil realm. A company eager to weaken an
offending competitor obeys no constraints when it strikes with the
sword of ... [RICO] .... 57
The second feature is similar to the first. In addition to the crimes
listed in section 1961 being applied equally broadly to private civil and
criminal RICO, the terms in section 1962 are given the same expansive
reading in both civil and criminal contexts. For example, what constitutes
a "pattern" of racketeering activity sufficient to prosecute also satisfies the
"pattern" requirement for civil damage suit. As with mail and wire fraud,
the Justice Department has instituted strict procedures to implement a policy
of selective and uniform enforcement of RICO. 8 But there is no coherent
policy behind the myriad of private suits filed each year; they are limited
only by the plaintiff attorney's imagination.
The third feature is confusion of precedent: the civil RICO cases are
expanding "the criminal law of fraud into areas and factual contexts where
that body of law has not previously been found. '59 Under the current
interpretive view, some serious criminal precedent is being built by civil
litigation.6 Many agree with Professor Abrams that "[t]here is something
unseemly in the phenomenon of courts creating in civil cases a kind of
expanded criminal law that prosecutors themselves are not willing to en-
force." 61
Thus, the "abuse" of RICO consists of civil plaintiffs' requesting its
extraordinary remedies for ordinary damages whereas at least prosecutorial
56. Note that the only court to hold RICO unconstittional did so in a civil case.
Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ohio 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d
279 (6th Cir. 1992); see supra note 33 for a list of criminal cases upholding RICO as
constitutional.
57. Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1402 (9th Cir.
1986) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., U.S. Attorneys' Manual, Chap. Title 9, Chapter 110, §§ 9-110.100 et seq.
(July 1, 1992). The Manual sets out detailed provisions for when and how RICO prosecutions
may be brought and articulates a policy that "a RICO count which merely duplicates the
elements of proof of a traditional Hobbs Act, Travel Act, mail fraud, wire fraud, gambling
or controlled substances caseU, will not be added to an indictment unless it serves some special
RICO purpose as enumerated herein." Id. § 9-110.200.
59. Abrams, supra note 47, at 11.
60. For example, both Sedima and H.J. were civil cases brought by private parties.
61. Abrams, supra note 47, at 11.
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discretion more or less confines RICO's criminal applications to extra-
ordinary crimes. 62 The problem is the inability of courts to limit the private
civil side without also limiting the criminal side. As Professor Lynch sums
it up:
The defenders of civil RICO are by and large correct that the ...
most ridiculous examples of wild RICO claims are cases that have
been dismissed by the courts. But the critics, I think, are more
fundamentally correct. If over seventy percent of the civil RICO
cases are essentially ordinary business disputes in which no prose-
cutor would dream of charging criminal violations, there is little
justification for continuing a civil remedy as broad as the present
law contains.
It is worth emphasizing yet again ... that the only difference
between civil RICO and criminal RICO is the greater restraint and
the more limited resources of prosecutors. Every civil RICO claim
that survives a motion to dismiss by definition charges the defendant
with a criminal violation of RICO. If the civil remedy is excessive,
then so is the definition of the crime. 63
Federal courts, especially district courts, have not been blind to this
abuse; their hostility to private civil RICO is well documented. 64 But the
Supreme Court has given the lower courts precious little help in finding
restraints in the statute itself.65 For example, though it is true that under
some circumstances the "enterprise" must be different from the defendant
"person," this is hardly a meaningful constraint. It is not difficult, with a
little imagination, to find an "enterprise" once one targets the defendant.
66
62. But see Crovitz, supra note 1, at 20-26 (delivering powerful critique of how former
U.S. Attorney for Manhattan, Rudolph Giuliani, abused RICO in his investigation and
prosecution of Drexel Burnham Lambert by using statute against small tax firm simply to
coerce firm's partners to testify against Drexel).
63. Lynch, supra note 48, at 797.
64. See, e.g., MATHEWS E r AL., supra note 3, at 1-22 n.45 (listing examples). Judge
Winter of the Second Circuit expressed the frustration of the private civil RICO circus in his
Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at Harvard, October 13, 1992, noting that "[C]ourts presently
tend to scrutinize civil RICO claims with far more skepticism than they scrutinize criminal
RICO charges." Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DuKE L.J. 945, 961 (1993).
65. Courts constrain would-be RICO plaintiffs other than through the statute itself. For
example, courts regularly sustain motions to dismiss under FED. R. Civ. P. 9, which governs
the failure to plead fraud with particularity. See, e.g., Bennet v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1062-
63 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc, 710 F.2d 1361, cert denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Morin
v. Trupin, 747 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), dismissed in part, 778 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). And commentators note that "the consequence of this hostility is that civil RICO
plaintiffs can count on heightened scrutiny of their claims." MATHEWS ET AL., supra note 3,
at 1-26.
66. See, e.g., Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1358 (3d Cir.
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Likewise, as a way of putting some teeth into the pattern requirement,
one could read H.J. as approving attempts to stress the "continuity" prong
of the test.67 And some lower courts have been doing exactly that.68 However,
even a strict continuity requirement would not prevent the section 1962(c)
RICO "abuse" so often complained of: the transformation of ordinary
business disputes (literally) into federal cases.6 9 The Reves case itself provides
a good example of this abuse, as well as the general problems that could
result from an unrestricted private civil RICO remedy.
SECTION II
Until the Supreme Court decided the Reves case, there was considerable
confusion over the reach of section 1962(c), which reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indi-
rectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
70
Recall that the essence of a RICO violation is the relationship between
the alleged predicate acts and the alleged enterprise. Judge Pierce put it
best in U.S. v. Stofsky: "Set forth, then, on the face of [the statute] is a
necessary connection between the person who would commit the enumerated
predicate acts and the enterprise, and between the acts and that person's
participation in the operations of the enterprise.'
'
17
1987) (setting out chart of plaintiff's six alternative theories of liability). See generally DAVID
B. SMITH & TERRANCE 0. REED, CIVIL RICO 7.02 at 7-22.3 (1992) ("Shifting enterprise
allegations for the sole purpose of targeting specific civil defendants adds to the increasingly
surreal image afflicting RICO ... ."); id. 3.05 at 3-42.
67. E.g., "Congress intended ... that RICO reach activities that amount to or threaten
long-term criminal activity." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243 n.4
(1989); "Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct." Id. at 242; "A
party ... may demonstrate continuity ... by proving a series of related predicates extending
over a substantial period of time." Id.; "the threat of continuity is sufficiently established
where the predicates [form part of] a long-term association that exists for criminal purposes."
(this is the "organized crime nexus" which the court declines to require later in the opinion).
Id. at 242-43 (all emphasis supplied). Judge Fairchild pointed out in December 1990 that "the
Seventh Circuit has decided several [civil] cases since H.J. Inc. and has in each case concluded
that the necessary continuity was absent." Hartz v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 469, 472 (7th Cir.
1990). Hartz joined the list.
68. See, e.g., HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 828 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that span
of four years was insufficient to show "continuity" in mixed commercial and political context
of zoning decision because those kinds of decisions simply take that long), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1009 (1988).
69. See infra Section III.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
71. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (emphasis supplied).
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The open question, before Reves, was how tight the second "necessary
connection," or nexus, described in Stofsky must be. 72 Specifically, the
question was the meaning of the phrase "to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs.
'73
The plaintiff's bar typically sought to use section 1962(c) to place
liability on law firms and accounting firms who provided advice and services
to an "enterprise" that was itself engaged in racketeering activity.74 The
argument was that the services provided by these firms constituted partici-
pation in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs. As a practical matter,
because accountants and attorneys routinely involve themselves with the
operations of their corporate clients, often serving as secretaries or other
officers, the potential expansion of RICO liability to even their ordinary
services presents a serious problem.75 The facts of Reves provide an example.
A. The Facts and Issue in Reves
Reves was a private civil RICO action filed against an accounting firm
that had provided services to the Farmer's Cooperative of Arkansas and
Oklahoma, Inc. (Co-op). The Co-op was run by a Board of Directors
(Board) elected by the members at an annual meeting. It financed its
operations chiefly through demand notes which it promoted to its (mostly
farmer) membership as a safe, secure "Investment Program."
76
Through the machinations of its general manager, the Co-op became
the owner of a gasohol plant (Plant) that was losing money hand over fist.
When it came time to prepare financial statements for Fiscal Year 1981, a
72. For an example of how each nexus Judge Pierce describes receives separate analysis
in one case, see the first panel decision in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Local Union 639, 839
F.2d 782, 794 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988), vacated, .492 U.S. 914 (1989).
The respondent in Reves also captures the idea quite nicely in this passage:
[T]he most difficult interpretative problems ... involv[e] outsiders who act inde-
pendently of a legitimate enterprise; the knotty issue in such cases is determining at
what point the activities ... become sufficiently connected to the enterprise that it
is reasonable to treat the outsiders as participating in the conduct of the enterprise's
affairs.
Respondent's Brief, at 29, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993) (No. 91-886).
73. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1166 (1993).
74. See, e.g., Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988) (involving complaint
against outside attorney alleging that outside attorney had stake in enterprise Savings and
Loan institution, held position of influence, and reviewed institution's misleading reports and
releases to public, was sufficient to state RICO claim); Odesser v. Continental Bank, 676 F.
Supp. 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (involving complaint by founder of company of attorney's
involvement in inter-company struggle for control sufficient to state claim under RICO).
75. Jay K. Wright, Why Are Professionals Worried About RICO? 65 NoME DAM L.
REv. 983, 984 (1990) (arguing that RICO has "exacerbat[ed]" tendencies in the law to expose
professionals to "enormous, potentially indeterminate damages wholly disproportionate to the
professional's undertaking or conduct").
76. The facts are taken from the circuit court's opinion, Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves,
937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), aff'd sub nom. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163
(1993).
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proper valuation of the Plant would have resulted in the Co-op showing a
negative net worth that would likely have provoked a run on the Co-op's
notes. In preparing the financial statements, the outside Auditor improperly
over-valued the asset so as to show a positive net worth for the Co-op.
77
The Auditor did include a warning in the financial statements about the
Plant's continued operation and likewise did issue a qualified opinion, but
did not disclose the improper overvaluation to the Board.
78
The Board condensed the financial statements into a misleading form
(chiefly by leaving off the qualifying notes relevant to the Plant), which the
Auditor presented to the membership at the 1982 annual meeting without
disclosing either the Auditor's qualified opinion or improper valuation. A
similar series of events occurred the following year.
Despite these and other efforts, the Co-op went bankrupt. Plaintiffs,
being the class of noteholders who bought demand notes between the date
of the Co-op's acquisition of the Plant and the date of bankruptcy, filed
suit against, among others, the Auditor. Although this cannot be charac-
terized as anything more than an ordinary fraud case for which there are
already state and federal penalties, the lure of RICO was irresistible.
7 9
The plaintiffs alleged that the Auditor violated section 1962(c) because
it had induced continued investment in the Co-op by concealing the proper
valuation of the Plant from the membership. There was no dispute that the
Auditor committed a "pattern" of "racketeering activity," that the Co-op
was an "enterprise," or that the Auditor was "employed by or associated
with" the Co-op. Rather, the question presented was whether the Auditor
"participate[d], directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs." 0
77. Because the Co-op's auditors changed names several times during the relevant time-
period, from Russell Brown & Company to Arthur Young to Ernst & Young, and because
those who performed the auditing functions were partners in the firms, I will simply refer to
them as the "Auditor." If the auditing had been done by employees, that would raise the
issue of whether it is appropriate to impute liability to the corporations. Cf. Philip A. Lacovara
& David P. Nicoli, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Organizations: RICO as an Example of a
Flawed Principle in Practice, 64 ST. JoiN's L. Rv. 725 (1990). Lacovara and Nicoli's very
interesting article might contain a better formulation of the "participation" test than any
circuit has yet come up with. But it is not quite on point, I think, with the issues raised by
Reves where a partnership, which is not named as both defendant and enterprise, is threatened
with civil liability for the actions of one of its principals.
78. That the valuation was improper was not disputed in the case. The note to the Co-
op's financial statements showed that the gasohol plant lost $1.2 million that year, and warned
that those losses "cast doubt on the recovery of the co-op of its investment." The relevant
note on the Auditor's qualified opinion stated that the Auditor had "some doubt" about the
recoverability of the plant. The Auditor presented both the financials it had prepared and the
opinion it had rendered on them to the Co-op's Board of Directors (Board), but did not tell
the Board it had improperly overvalued the plant.
79. Indeed, given RICO's easy availability, plaintiffs' lawyers might have been subject
to sanctions for failing to advocate zealously their clients' case if they had not used RICO.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). The "racketeering" activity was commission of mail
fraud (the mailing of the misleading condensed financials) and securities fraud (inducing the
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The Eighth Circuit decided there must be a tight nexus, holding that
civil liability "ordinarily will require some participation in the operation or
management of the enterprise itself" by the defendant.8 1 It then affirmed
the summary judgment granted by the district court, holding that the
Auditor's actions "in no way rise to the level of participation in the
management or operation of the Co-op." 8 2
This "operation or management" test was a minority position among
the circuits. Although the District of Columbia Circuit had adopted a more
restrictive "control" test, the four other circuits which had addressed the
issue had accepted more attenuated connections as sufficient to incur lia-
bility.83
The Reves issue illustrates the difficulties presented to the lower courts
by the Supreme Court's incessant expansiveness. When confronted with the
same issue, the District of Columbia Circuit buttressed its narrow reading
of the statute by invoking the rule of lenity-ambiguous penal statutes
should be construed narrowly-even though it was deciding a civil case,
because "violations of section 1962(c) can lead to criminal as well as civil
penalties. ' "4 As Judge Mikva noted in his concurrence, invoking the rule
of lenity was "discomfiting" in a civil case, "to which the lenity rule is
normally inapplicable," and all the more so because it went completely
purchase of demand notes through the concealment of the true value of the plant). Reves, 937
F.2d at 1321. The "pattern" consisted of the performance of the racketeering activity at two
annual meetings.
81. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1321 (8th Cir. 1991), aff'd sub nom.,
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993). This is basically how both the respondent
and petitioner put the question in their Supreme Court briefs (though with different slants).
By this decision, the Eighth Circuit continued its traditional restrictive reading of RICO (it
was the circuit which developed the "multiple scheme" requirement reversed in H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989)). Here, it bucked the clear weight of authority
and blessed as doctrine eight-year-old dicta from its en banc decision in Bennett v. Berg, 710
F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
82. Reves, 937 F.2d at 1324.
83. See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 954 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("The crucial question is not whether a person is an insider or an outsider,
but whether and to what extent that person controls the course of the enterprise's business."),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991). The Second Circuit, in United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d
47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981), opined that the proper nexus was shown
whenever the defendant was able to commit the predicate offenses "solely by virtue of his
... involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise," or "the predicate offenses
are related to the activities of that enterprise." Id. at 54. This test was also used by the Ninth
Circuit. See United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 866 (1988). A slightly more restrictive view was taken by the Fifth Circuit that basically
substituted an "and" for Scotto's "or." United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332-33 (5th
Cir. 1983) (predicate acts must both (1) be related to enterprise's affairs and (2) be enabled
by defendant's association with enterprise), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). Finally, the
Eleventh Circuit, in Bank of America v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986),
decided that the only nexus required was "the performance of activities necessary or helpful
to the operation of the enterprise." Id. at 970.
84. Yellow Bus, 913 F.2d at 955.
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against the text, the legislative history, and the Supreme Court's consistently
expansive interpretation of RICO.8 5 Judge Mikva then asked the question
which is central to this article: why should one element of RICO be read
narrowly when others are read broadly? The Supreme Court's opinion in
Reves does nothing to answer that question.
B. The Supreme Court Opinion in Reves
1. Exercising Judicial Fiat
Justice Blackmun's opinion, for a six member majority, affirmed both
the Eighth Circuit's "operation or management" test and the court's ap-
plication of the test to the facts. The holding rested upon a micro-analysis
of section 1962(c)'s language.8 6 The Court insisted that the "narrow ques-
tion" was the meaning of the statutory phrase "to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs[.]"' s7 The
Court found the answer in the "plain meaning" rule of statutory construc-
tion, stating the rule this way:
If the statutory language is unambiguous, 'in the absence of a
"clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." 88
The Court relied on Webster's Third New International Dictionary and
Black's Law Dictionary to assert that the words "conduct" and "partici-
pate" are unambiguous. The Court then looked for "clearly expressed
legislative intent" contrary to the asserted "plain meaning" and found
none. It also dismissed Congress's liberal construction provision as inappli-
cable because it "only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity,"89 and
defended its decision as consistent with the overall structure of RICO. A
closer examination of these analytical moves reveals the essentially arbitrary
nature of the Court's rationale.
Eager to avoid the liberal construction clause, the Court attempted to
place its decision on the "plain meaning" of the words in the disputed
provision. 9° Specifically, the Court decided that since the verb "conduct"
85. Id. at 957.
86. The holding comes in Section III of the opinion. Sections I and II describe the facts
and proceedings below, Sections IV and V consider supplementary issues of legislative history,
liberal interpretation, and the overall statutory scheme. Section VI applies the stated test to
the facts.
87. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1172 (quote marks omitted).
90. The Court invoked the legislative history and the statutory scheme as mere supports
for, not the bases of, its decision. It asserted that the operation or management test "finds
further support in the legislative history of § 1962," Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1170, but demonstrates
only that members of Congress understood § 1962(c) to apply to participation in the operation
or mAnagement, which the Court conceded "does not necessarily mean that they understood
§ 1962(c) to be limited to the operation or management of an enterprise." Id. at 1172 (emphasis
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means "lead, run, manage, or direct," 9' the noun form must be given the
same meaning, thereby becoming a limiting term. The Court emphasized
that liability attaches not to mere participation in the affairs, but partici-
pation in the "conduct" of the affairs. It then decided that since "conduct"
has a restrictive meaning, so must "participate," because a liberal reading
of the verb "participate" would nullify the already decided-upon restrictive
meaning of the noun "conduct."
The Court's analysis is deficient in several respects. First, the Court
gave no principled reason why the verb form of "conduct" should constrain
the meaning of the noun form and not vice versa. In a kind of verbal judo,
Justice Souter's dissent demonstrated that the broad meaning of the noun
"conduct" could be read to expand the meaning of the verb. 92 He persua-
sively argued that the Court cannot base its interpretation on "plain
meaning" but must use judicial rules of statutory construction.
Second, the Court's definition of "participate" is completely tautolog-
ical. The Court's analysis began with a decision to interpret the word
"conduct" narrowly in its verb form, then use that narrow definition to
control the interpretation of the noun "conduct," and then use that narrow
definition of the noun "conduct" to restrict the meaning of the verb
"participate." But, since the very broad verb "participate" appears in front
of the noun "conduct," it also "seems reasonable" to either (1) give each
version of "conduct" a different meaning or (2) use the broad meaning of
''participate" to require that the noun "conduct" also be broadly construed
and use the meaning of the noun to control the meaning of the verb.
Third, to the extent that the term "participate" refers to the degree of
activity required to incur liability, not the level of the enterprise's organi-
zational structure at which the activity takes place, its meaning may be
entirely divorced from the meaning of "conduct." One may have a tenuous
connection to high-level activities (such as Board meetings or management
decisions) or a close connection to low-level activities. This distinction was
raised in oral arguments when the Court pressed the government on the
question of whether the statute would reach company ditch-diggers or
secretaries who may participate in the racketeering activity (by burying
bodies or destroying records, for example). 9 The Court decided that the
added). The Court devoted the rest of the opinion to defending its announced narrow
interpretation. See id. (stating that liberal construction clause "does not require rejection of
the ... test."); id. at 1173 (asserting that liability is "not limited to upper management" and
is also not limited to "insiders" in that "outsiders may be liable ... if they are 'associated
with' an enterprise and ... participate in the operation or management of the enterprise
itself").
91. Id. at 1169.
92. See id. at 1174 ("[E]ven when 'conduct' is used as a verb, '[tihe notion of direction
or leadership is often obscured or lost; e.g., an investigation is conducted by all those who
take part in it."') (quoting 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY 691 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis in
original)).
93. 16 RICO L. Rep. 905, 917-18 (Nov. 1992).
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answer to that question was beyond the scope of the case.Y Therefore, the
Court's view of the proper definition of "participate" should similarly be
viewed as dicta only.
Finally, it seems especially inappropriate to attempt to construe the
relationship between the alleged predicate acts and the enterprise by the
dictionary definition of the word "conduct." It is not the word, but the
concept of the statute that needs definition. And that seems to call for a
more sophisticated interpretation than available from Webster's.
In sum, whatever the meaning of section 1962(c) is, it is not plain. The
Court's pretense otherwise is little more that an exercise of judicial fiat.
2. Reversing the Course of Precedent
A more troubling aspect of the Reves opinion is that the Court's descent
into word-chopping takes it far afield from its previous interpretive approach
without marking any new interpretive trails for lower courts to follow. For
example, the Turkette Court decided that, given "the purposes and goals
of the Act, as well as the language of the statute," 95 it would presume that
the terms of the statute should be given their broadest reading, unless there
was "some positive sign" 96 that Congress intended otherwise. The Reves
Court reversed this presumption. As shown above, both broad and narrow
interpretations of the disputed language are reasonably available. Yet the
Reves Court essentially ignored the Turkette approach, presuming the more
restrictive interpretation and placing upon the advocates of the liberal view
the burden of disproving the presumption.
Likewise, the Reves Court insisted that RICO's liberal construction
clause "is not an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that Congress
never intended." 97 This is news. Both Sedima and Turkette clearly stand
for precisely the opposite proposition, both in their actual decisions and in
the language used to reach those decisions. While explicitly admitting that
"in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite different
from the original conception of its enactors," 98 the Sedima Court nonetheless
maintained that "all of the Act's provisions" should be read in the "spirit"
that RICO was "an aggressive initiative to supplement old remedies and
develop new methods for fighting crime," 99 and explicitly approved the
statutes application "in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress."'1°
The Reves Court did not explain why the dramatic expansion of RICO
sanctioned by the Sedima Court was acceptable, but the requested expansion
of RICO in Reves was denied.
94. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 n.9 (1993).
95. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981).
96. Id. at 593.
97. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1172.
98. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 423 U.S. 479, 500 (1985).
99. Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 499 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d
384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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Finally, by requiring a civil RICO defendant to participate in the
operation or management of the RICO enterprise, the Reves Court sug-
gested, in more dicta, that section 1962(c) is qualitatively different from
sections 1962(a) and (b) because sections 1962(a) and (b) address "infiltration
of legitimate organizations by 'outsiders' whereas section 1962(c) is "lim-
ited to persons 'employed by or associated with' an enterprise.''0 But lower
courts have built substantial precedent precisely on the idea that section 1962(c)
applies equally to "outsiders" as well as "insiders." 10 2 By failing to address
this precedent and adopting a macro view of the statute arguably departing
from it, the Reves Court again leaves lower courts wondering which way
to go.
Dissenting in Sedima, Justice Powell glumly predicted that "the Court
seems to mandate that all future courts read the entire statute broadly."'
0 3
Reves proves him wrong, but the decision is no cause for joy. The concern
articulated by Judge Mikva is not addressed by the Court's opinion in
Reves: why should RICO be interpreted narrowly in this case but not in
others?
SECTION III
I offer a principled basis for the decision in Reves which may also
resolve other interpretive problems: because the statute is partly punitive
101. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 (1993) (quoting § 1962(c)).
102. Much of the precedent arises from the Operation Greylord cases in the Seventh
Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1390 (7th Cir. 1988) (lawyer who
bribed judge associated with enterprise court); United States v. Yonan, 800 F.2d 164, 167 (7th
Cir. 1986) (lawyer who bribed States' Attorney associated with enterprise office), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1055 (1987); see also United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (bail
bondsman bribing magistrate and paying kickbacks to sheriff was associated with enterprise
sheriff's office); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977) (magistrate
who accepts bribes from bonding company was associated with enterprise bonding company).
See also cases cited in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782, 793-
94 (D.C. Cir.) (Mikva, J. for the panel), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988), vacated, 492 U.S.
914 (1989).
Indeed, the Reves Court's decision could be read as approval of the theory used by the
overruled district judge in Yonan, who held that to be "associated with" an enterprise, one
had to be "associated with the enterprise as such, not merely with some other individual who
is 'employed by or associated with' the enterprise but is off on a frolic and detour of his or
her own." United States v. Yonan, 623 F. Supp. 881, 885 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd, 800 F.2d
164 (7th Cir. 1986).
103. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 529 (1985). The lower courts have
not hesitated to use the "operation or management" test announced in Reves to throw out
civil RICO counts. See, e.g., Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding trial
court's dismissal under FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6) of RICO count against defendant attorney
who provided legal services to RICO enterprise to help it commit and then cover up state
securities fraud; attorney did not participate in management or operation of scheme such as
to expose him to RICO liability); Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1993) (overturning
RICO § 1962(c) jury verdict against defendant CPA; CPA did not participate in management
or operation of RICO enterprise engaged in abusive tax shelter scheme merely by his concededly
criminal activities as salesman for enterprise).
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and partly remedial, it should be subject to a dual interpretation. Courts
should not hesitate to interpret the same language strictly in some cases and
liberally in others. Unfortunately, the structure of the statute precludes a
simple application of this principle. Dual construction here would have to
operate at two levels. First, the statute should be strictly construed when
plaintiffs are private parties as compared to when the government prosecutes
the action-a kind of reverse rule of lenity. Second, in private civil RICO
cases, the liability provisions of sections 1961 and 1962 generally should be
given narrow scope, whereas the remedial provision of section 1964(c)
normally should be given broad scope.' 4
This interpretive approach takes its initial inspiration from Justice
Powell's dissent in Sedima where he asserted that
[i]t is neither necessary to the Court's decision, nor in my view
correct, to read the civil RICO provisions so expansively. We ruled
in Turkette and Russello that the statute must be read broadly and
construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purposes, but like the
legislative history to which the Court alludes, it is clear we were
referring there to RICO's criminal provisions. It does not necessarily
follow that the same principles apply to RICO's private civil pro-
visions. 05
Justice Powell's remarks have been called "perverse" and "a classic example
of result-oriented jurisprudence. '"101 However, as the following discussion
shows, they do not deserve such a casually brutal dismissal. To the contrary,
they contain the seeds of a principled interpretive approach to RICO based
on recognized canons of statutory construction that would be completely
harmonious with RICO's liberal construction clause.
A. The Case for Dual Interpretation
As seen above, RICO is structured so that the same predicate acts
defined in sections 1961 and 1962 form the basis of both civil and criminal
liability. This structure is not unique, either at the federal or state level. A
familiar federal example is the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), where the
same predicate act, a willful submission of a false or fraudulent tax return
104. Clearly, the dual construction proposal is sound on policy grounds to the extent it
reduces the civil RICO caseload. Civil RICO cases are out of control. See DoucLAs E. ABRAMS,
THE LAW OF CivIm. Rico §§ 1.1, 1.2 (1991). Available doctrinal constraints (such as the pattern
requirement) simply do not keep garden variety commercial cases from choking federal courts'
civil caseload. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69. There is no reason to believe that
state law and non-RICO federal statutes do not sufficiently vindicate rights absent RICO. In
short, curbing civil RICO would be a "good thing." Naturally, these are the reasons that
Congress should curb civil RICO. Because courts should not base decisions on these types of
reasons, I put them aside. While policy provides a motivation for looking for applicable canons
of construction, it does not provide the basis for it.
105. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 529 (emphasis under "criminal" in original, other added).
106. DAviD B. SmrrH & TERRANCE G. REED, CIVIL RICO 1.02, at 1-13 n.13 (1992).
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"may subject a taxpayer not only to criminal penalties under sections 7206
and 7207 of the Code, but, as well, to a civil penalty, under section 6653(b),
of 50% of the underpayment."''0 7 Likewise, several states have enacted laws
under which acting in the capacity of a real estate broker or salesperson
without being so licensed is the basis both for criminal liability and for
civil recovery from a state fund by those who have lost money in reliance
on the wrongdoer.108
Experience with these and other statutes demonstrates that when the
same statute serves two distinct purposes, courts apply a dual interpreta-
tion.'09 To be sure, the courts normally construe the remedial part of the
statute (usually the civil) more liberally than the penal (usually the crimi-
nal)." 0 But the important point, for now, is that the same words which are
interpreted strictly in one context are interpreted liberally in another because
of the different purposes of the statute.
1. Statutes That Are Both Civil and Criminal
Examples abound in which a court has given a liberal interpretation to
a statute in a civil case when the same statute has been, or would be,
applied narrowly in a criminal case. Each of the following five examples
involves a statutory scheme like RICO, in which the same predicate acts
form the basis for civil or criminal liability. The first two examples draw
from federal statutes; the last three examples demonstrate that state courts
have also adopted dual interpretations of statutes with a RICO-type struc-
ture.
First, in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., the issue was whether the
term "willful" in a civil provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act," 2 had
the same meaning as the same term used in a criminal provision.13 The
defendant contended that the term "willful" meant the same thing in both
provisions: bad purpose or evil intent. The court instead adopted a less
strict definition of the term for its use in civil cases.
107. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 308 (1978); see also Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (holding that acquittal of criminal charges for fraudulent
deductions and willful failure to report income is no bar to civil assessment of 50% additional
tax). Compare IRC § 6672 (1988) (civil) with IRC § 7202 (1988) (criminal) (imposing their
respective penalties upon exact same predicate act by any person required to collect, account
for, and pay over any tax (such as excise taxes or withholding) who "willfully fails to collect
or truthfully account for and pay over" such tax).
108. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of Moeller v. Colorado
Real Estate Commission; see also Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies
To Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTNOS L.J. 1325, 1336-37 (1991).
109. See generally SOUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.04 (5th ed. 1990).
110. See, e.g., Nuclear Corp. of Am. v. Hale, 355 F. Supp. 193, 197 (N.D. Tex. 1973)
(refusing to infer in civil recovery provision of Texas materialman statute requirement to prove
fraudulent intent contained in statute's misdemeanor provision).
111. 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 216(d) (1988).
113. Id. § 216(a).
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[Defendant] contends that "willful" in the suit-limitation provision
takes on the interpretation given the same word in the criminal
provision.... We do not agree that the criminal construction is to
be imparted into the civil provision simply because both provisions
are part of the same statute. The purposes of the two sections are
entirely different; one punishes as criminal certain specified conduct
while the other subserves a policy to which punishment in entirely
foreign."14
Second, the term "willfully" has been construed to place an easier
burden of production upon the government in civil than in criminal tax
cases. For example, in Domanus v. United States,"5 the appellant had been
assessed a civil penalty under section 6672 for 100% of the tax owed for
willfully falling to withhold employee social security and income taxes. He
was found liable for the penalty under a definition of "willfully" as
"voluntary, conscious and intentional-as opposed to accidental-decisions
not to remit funds properly withheld to the Government."" 6 The taxpayer
argued that the government should be required to prove "willfully" ac-
cording to its settled definition in section 7202, the mirror-image criminal
counterpart to section 6672: an intentional violation of a known legal duty.
The court held that Congress had evidenced an intent that criminal tax
statutes, but not civil, be excepted from the usual rule that ignorance of
the law is no excuse. Therefore, the term "willfully" had been interpreted
strictly against the government in criminal cases. However, "the special
definition of 'willfully' for criminal tax statutes is not required in applying
civil tax statutes," because the purpose of the civil remedies was to allow
"the United States the ability to collect wayward trust fund taxes.' 1 7 In
effect, the different purposes attendant to the civil and criminal parts of
the statute warranted different interpretations of the same term.
Third, turning from federal to state statutes, the same Colorado stat-
utory provision"' defines who is a "real estate broker" and "real estate
salesmen" both for determining criminal sanctions" 9 and for determining if
someone injured by a wrongdoer acting in the capacity of a real estate
broker or salesperson is entitled to recover from the state compensation
114. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 461-62 n.230 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
But cf. U.S. v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1976) (refusing to give different
interpretations to civil and criminal lOb-5 cases). The Charney court did not apply different
standards because "the primary difference between criminal and civil prosecutions under the
securities laws is the burden of proof required for a verdict," and therefore "there is no
reasonable basis for holding that some different interpretation of Rule lob-5 should apply to
a criminal action than in a civil action." Id. (citations omitted).
115. 961 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1992).
116. Domanus v. United States, 961 F.2d 1323, 1324 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Monday v.
United States, 421 F.2d 1210, 1216 (7th Cir. 1970)).
117. Id. at 1326.
118. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-61-101 (1973).
119. Id. § 12-71-119.
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fund. 20 Although the Colorado Supreme Court had interpreted this provi-
sion narrowly in criminal cases,' 2' the same court adopted an expansive
interpretation of the same language for plaintiffs seeking recovery from the
fund in Moeller v. Colorado Real Estate Commission, 22 explaining that "in
this case ... a person is not being punished for unlawfully conducting
business as a real estate broker without a license.'' 23
Fourth, under Missouri law the same statutory section defines a "pyr-
amid scheme" for both civil and criminal actions. 24 Yet the Missouri courts
have demonstrated their willingness to construe that section differently in
criminal and civil cases. Thus, in State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Wahl, 25 the state
sought to enjoin defendants from running a pyramid scheme and expressly
stipulated that it would not prosecute the defendants criminally. 126 The court
explicitly adopted a liberal interpretation to find that the defendant's activ-
ities came within the scope of the statute only after noting that "what the
state is seeking is the remedial remedies of the chapter, and not the penal
portions." 27
Finally, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that
It is by no means new in our law to hold that statutes of a double
aspect (penal and remedial) may be given a liberal construction in
the civil courts when applied remedially, and yet be strictly construed
in the criminal courts, when one is prosecuted in the latter for a
violation. 21
Newsom v. F. W. Poe Mfg. Co. 2 9 provides an example of how that count
has applied the dual construction doctrine. There, the statute at issue
required only the posting of a notice that children under fourteen were not
to clean moving machinery. It did not expressly forbid children from actually
120. Id. § 12-61-302.
121. E.g., Cary v. Borden Co., 386 P.2d 585, 587 (Colo. 1963).
122. 759 P.2d 697 (Colo. 1988).
123. Moeller v. Colorado Real Estate Comm'n, 759 P.2d 697, 701 n.2 (Colo. 1988).
124. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.400 (1978). A typical pyramid scheme is a chain letter with
five names listed and instructions for the recipient to send some amount of money to the first
named person, strike off that person's name, put the recipient's name as the fifth on the list,
and send the letter out to ten people, with the promise that when the recipient rises to the
top of the list, the money will come rolling in from those just joining, who form the base of
the pyramid.
125. 600 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
126. State ex reL. Ashcroft v. Wahl, 600 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) ("[A]lthough
§ 407.420 provides that a willful violation of § 407.405 shall constitute a felony, any possibility
of a criminal charge has been abandoned by the state pursuant to its open-court stipulation.").
127. Id. at 180-81.
128. McKenzie v. Peoples Baking Co., 31 S.E.2d 154, 155 (S.C. 1944). The court held
that in a personal injury action the state's Pure Food Statute would be liberally construed to
bring a piece of steel found in a cake under the definition of "ingredient," even though the
"statute has a criminal side and if the defendant were resisting a prosecution for its violation,
strict construction [of that term] might be in order." Id.
129. 86 S.E. 195 (S.C. 1915).
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cleaning. In a personal injury action, the court used the principle of dual
construction to justify a liberal reading in the civil context, stating:
The remedy must [not] be destroyed by the penalty, if practicable.
We are now on the civil side of the court .... The Legislature must
not be held to require a false notice to be posted, but to have
intended by that act to make the act of cleaning moving machinery
... by children under 14 years of age, unlawful. If [the shop
foreman] were indicted for the offense, the penal feature might
fail. 130
2. Statutes That Are Civil Only
Because the principle behind the canon of dual construction is that the
same statute may have different purposes in different contexts, dual con-
struction has not been limited to distinguishing criminal from civil appli-
cations. Courts have applied the principle to statutes which have no criminal
application at all, but which are nevertheless viewed as both penal and
remedial in nature. Courts broadly construe such statutes when to do so
would extend the remedy but narrowly construe the statutes as to liability.'13
I offer two examples.
a. Gambling Statutes
Consider, for example, the South Carolina laws on gambling. Section
6308 of the 1942 South Carolina Code provided that any person who "at
any time or sitting" lost more than fifty dollars could sue for recovery
within three months.3 2 The next section, 6309, provided that if the loser
did not file suit within the period, then "it shall be lawful for any person
to sue for and recover such loss, and treble the value thereof, against the
winner" if the suit was brought within the year.
In Francis v. Mauldin,"' Francis sued Mauldin on a note and Mauldin
counter-claimed under section 6308, pleading that the amount due under
the note had been lost on a certain date "in a gambling or dice game."
Francis demurred, asserting that the pleading failed to state a cause of
action because it did not properly allege "at any time or sitting." In support
130. Newsom v. F.W. Poe Mfg. Co., 86 S.E. 195, 198 (S.C. 1915). The word "not"
appears to have been left out of the reported decision. Later cases which have quoted the
same language also insert "not." See McKenzie, 31 S.E.2d at 155.
131. See, e.g., City of Madison v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 243 N.W.2d 422 (Wis. 1976)
(holding that term "persons" in provision of state antitrust statute granting standing to sue
for treble damages includes city and county under liberal construction); State v. Hodges, 305'
S.E.2d 278, 284 n.2 (W. Va. 1983) (noting that in criminal prosecution for carrying firearms
without license, State bears burden of persuasion to prove absence of license, but in civil case
burden of persuasion rests on defendant to show license).
132. Francis v. Mauldin, 55 S.E.2d 337, 339 (S.C. 1949) (quoting § 6308 of 1942 South
Carolina Code).
133. 55 S.E.2d 337 (S.C. 1949).
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of his demurrer, Francis cited an earlier case where the Court had held that
pleading a gambling loss on a certain date "by playing at faro" did not




The Francis Court refused to apply the precedent because the former
case "involved an action under the penal section of the Code [6309]," so
that "the court gave to the allegation 'playing at faro' a rigid construction,"
and concluding "we do not think this holding is controlling in the case
before us."' 35 Other states have made the same distinction with respect to
similar statutes.136
b. Director Liability Statutes
Statutes making directors and officers of corporations personally liable
for all the debts of the corporation for breaches of duty such as failure to
file corporate reports or filing false reports also have been construed
according to whether their application in a case is seen as penal or remedial.
The Supreme Court recognized the difference over 100 years ago:
As the statute imposes a burdensome liability on the officers for
their wrongful act, it may well be considered penal, in the sense
that it should be strictly construed. But as it gives a civil remedy,
at the private suit of the creditor only, and measured by the amount
of his debt, it is as to him clearly remedial.
3 7
The Colorado Supreme Court relied on that distinction to liberally
construe that state's director liability statute so as to extend its remedy to
a creditor's assignee. 38 The Oklahoma Supreme Court followed suit as to
extending the availability of the statute, 39 but later construed the same
statute strictly when called upon to determine a director's liability. 40 In the
later case, the court was presented with a corporate director who knew that
an illegal distribution of dividends was to be made, planned to be at the
Board of Directors' meeting in which it was made but did not make the
meeting, was one of the beneficiaries of the distribution, and accepted the
134. Id. at 339.
135. Id.
136. For more examples of the same distinction between the penal and remedial aspect
of gambling statutes, see cases collected in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U5.S. 657, 667 (1892)
("A statute giving the right to recover back money lost at gaming and, if the loser does not
sue within a certain time, authorizing a qui tam action to be brought by any other person for
threefold the amount, has been held to be remedial as to the loser, though penal as regards
the suit by a common informer.").
137. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 676 (1892).
138. Credit Men's Adjustment Co. v. Vickery, 161 P. 297, 298 (Col. 1916) ("In some
respects the statute is penal, while in others it is remedial in character; penal in its nature as
to the directors for the purpose of determining their liability, and to be strictly construed.
When the liability is clearly shown, it is remedial in character as to creditors and to be liberally
construed in its enforcement.").
139. Colcord v. Granzow, 278 P. 654 (Okla. 1928).
140. Watkinson v. Adams, 103 P.2d 498 (Okla. 1940).
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illegal dividend. The statute made liable those directors "under whom the
[violation] may have happened," but excepted "those ... who were not
present when the same did happen."' 4' While acknowledging a previous
liberal interpretation of the statute, the Oklahoma court held that since it
was now presented with a question of liability, the statute had to be strictly
construed: "the Legislature has exempted the absent director and it is not
for this court, by judicial interpretation, to impose limitations upon the
express exemption of such a penal statute.' ' 42 Again, the Court was con-
struing the same language of the same'provision of the same statute liberally
in one instance and narrowly in another.
B. Applying the Doctrine of Dual Construction to RICO
The above review of cases clearly demonstrates that the doctrine of
dual construction applies whenever a statute has dual purposes, one of
which requires a broad interpretation and one of which requires a narrow
interpretation. RICO is such a statute. Its legislative history clearly reveals
that its provisions applicable to government actions and those granting the
private civil action, while pegged to the same predicate acts and defined by
the same language, nonetheless have distinct purposes. Moreover, like the
director liability statutes, RICO's private civil provision itself contains both
a penal and remedial aspect. Therefore, the doctrine of dual construction
applies at two levels.
At the first level, the doctrine would separate private party cases from
cases where the government prosecutes either a criminal or civil action.
Under this approach, the same language in sections 1961 and 1962 would
be read narrowly in the former and broadly in the latter class of cases.
Precedent established in one class would not apply to the other.
The legislative history of RICO clearly supports this treatment of RICO.
It shows that the "remedial purposes" which Congress can be appropriately
held to have intended for the private civil provision are much narrower
than the "remedial purposes" which Congress can be found to have intended
for the government-related provisions.
RICO was a product of the 1969 Senate, when Senators Hruska and
McClellen combined forces to modify Sen. Hruska's bill S.1623141 (which
itself modified and reassembled two bills Senator Hruska had introduced in
the previous session, S.2048 and S.2049) so as to complement Senator
McClellen's bill, S.30, the Organized Crime Control Act ("OCCA"). 44 The
result of their efforts was S.1861, the Corrupt Organizations Act, which
was added into S.30 as title IX, captioned "Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations."'
' 45
141. Id. at 499.
142. Id. at 500.
143. 115 CoNa. REc. 6995 (1969).
144. Id. at 769.
145. Id. at 9567-71.
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Although Senator Hruska's early bill contained a private civil remedies
provision, that provision was dropped in the S.1861 version. The deletion
was unexplained in the legislative history and committee records.'1 All the
Senate debates and reports on the bill that became RICO address only the
provisions relating to government action.' 47
The private civil remedies provision came from the House, with little
recorded discussion and debate. 148 Although it appears Representative Steiger
wanted to add a more comprehensive provision, he was unable to do so
and the short provision put in was not commented upon in the Conference
Report nor by any Senator. The most comprehensive statement of its intent
comes from the dissenting committee report in the House, where three
congressmen objected to the provision because it was too broad.' 49 Justice
Marshall summed up the narrow purpose of the civil provisions in Sedima:
Congress intended to give to businessmen who might otherwise have
had no available remedy a possible way to recover damages for
competitive injury, infiltration injury, or other economic injury
resulting out of, but wholly distinct from, the predicate acts. Con-
gress fully recognized that racketeers do not engage in predicate
acts as ends in themselves; instead, racketeers threaten, burn, and
murder in order to induce their victim to act in a way that accrues
to the economic benefit of the racketeer, as by ceasing to compete,
or agreeing to make certain purchases. Congress' concern was not
for the direct victims of the racketeers' acts, whom state and federal
laws already protected, but for the competitors and investors whose
businesses and interests are harmed or destroyed by racketeers....
Indeed, that is why Congress provided for recovery only for injury
to business or property-that is, commercial injuries-and not for
personal, physical or emotional injury.110
In contrast to the limited purposes of the civil remedies provision, the
Senate was driven to draft the criminal provisions very broadly.' 5 ' Unable
146. Professor William Blakey, who was then Chief Counsel to the Senate subcommittee
at that time, has asserted that-the civil provision was dropped in order to avoid "complex
legal issues" and "possible political problems," but he does not elaborate on what those were.
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 14, at 1017-18.
147. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 489 n.19 (2d Cir. 1984). For example,
the Senate version allowed the government to sue for injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)
gave a broad grant of jurisdiction to district courts to grant equitable relief in RICO cases.
Then, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) authorized the Attorney General to seek those remedies. Finally,
what is now 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) provided that a criminal conviction shall work to estop the
convicted person "from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any
subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States." (emphasis added). When the private
civil remedy was added, it was just plopped in between these provisions with no explanation
as to why it was placed between them and not simply appended.
148. See generally 116 CONG. REc. 35,342-43, 35,346 (1970).
149. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 181-96 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4007, 4076-91.
150. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 519-20 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151. See generally RICO, supra note 11, and Section I of this Article.
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to fashion the statute in precise terms without letting what might be
significant organized criminal activity through and desiring to destroy as
much of the organized crime monster as it could, it was forced, as Justice
Marshall noted, to rely on the Government to keep the criminal enforcement
targeted appropriately.
52
Consistent with this view of the legislative history, several circuits have
specifically held that the remedies granted to private plaintiffs are not nearly
as broad as those granted to the Government.' 53 Neither the Supreme Court
nor any circuit court has held otherwise.
Given this history, Congress's prefatory order to read the statute liberally
so as to "effectuate its remedial purposes" is best viewed as applicable to
the civil remedies created for the government, not private civil plaintiffs. It
therefore does no violence to the statute for the courts to construe the
statute narrowly in section 1964(c) cases, but liberally in others, as Justice
Powell suggested.
I would be remiss if I did not attempt to anticipate and deflect potential
objections to my analysis. Here, at least three objections may be raised as
to why the dual construction doctrine should not work this way.
First, it may be objected that the cases reviewed above relieved a civil
plaintiff of some burden that the government was required to shoulder, and
that many of them did so by construing terms which appeared in different
sections of the statute. In RICO, the terms appear just once, and what is
worse, they are given one statutory definition that makes no distinction
between how the term would apply in various contexts.
This objection is wrong in fact and deficient in theory. Several of the
cases reviewed above did indeed construe the same terms or section of a
statute differently in civil and criminal cases.' 5 4 Moreover, the objection is
mere form, devoid of substance. The principle behind the rule remains
constant: the same statute may contain different legislative purposes such
that it is appropriate to read it as two statutes. This principle logically
applies to giving a different interpretation to the same words in a statute,
depending upon the nature of the case before the court. All this rule of
construction requires for its application is for a court to treat 18 U.S.C.
section 1964(c) like the separate statute that it functionally is.
Second, some may object to the disregard of the rule of lenity. It seems
counter-intuitive to allow a more expansive construction in criminal cases
152. The Government has, in fact, limited the criminal enforcement, through its United
States Attorney's Manual guidelines, supra note 58.
153. For example, in Religious Technology Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1084 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987), the court held that the injunctive remedies
listed in § 1964(a) were available only to the Government and private plaintiffs were limited
to the damage remedies of § 1964(c).
154. See, e.g., the discussion of Moeller, supra note 122 and accompanying text (real
estate compensation fund); Ashcroft, supra note 125 and accompanying text (pyramid scheme
statute); Newsom, supra note 129 and accompanying text (child labor statute); Francis, supra
note 133 and accompanying text (South Carolina gambling statute); and Watkinson, supra
note 140 and accompanying text (Oklahoma director liability statute).
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than civil. The rationale behind the lenity rule, of course, is that criminal
sanctions are so severe that "fundamental principles of due process ...
mandate that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment,
whether his conduct is prohibited."'55 Therefore, construing ambiguities
against the government is not only fair, but constitutionally required. 5 6 And
indeed, the cases reviewed above use the dual construction doctrine consis-
tently with the rule of lenity, not contrary to it.
There was some speculation in the Reves oral argument about the
applicability of the rule of lenity. 57 It had recently been applied by the
Supreme Court in another civil case precisely because the same acts which
gave rise to civil liability also created potential criminal liability.' And the
Reves opinion does note that its decision is consistent with the rule of
lenity, thus perhaps fueling more speculation.1' 9
However, the rule of lenity is not a hard and fast doctrine but only an
aid to construction. It can be overborne by Congress's obvious intent.
6
0
That seems to be Justice Powell's point in Sedima: the Court had already
decided, in Turkette and Russello, that RICO's criminal provisions required
expansive reading when usually criminal provisions are given narrow scope.
Nor has the Supreme Court disregarded the constitutional aspects of
the rule of lenity in refusing to apply it to RICO. In Sedima the Court
rejected a narrow construction of section 1964(c) based on the rationale
behind the rule of lenity, refusing to "view the statute as being so close to
the constitutional edge."' 6' A moment's reflection reveals why. The rule of
lenity exists to protect defendants against unfair surprise. Since the predicate
acts of RICO are all well-defined crimes, 62 courts have had little difficulty
in dismissing constitutional challenges on the grounds that the defendants
155. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979).
156. See United States v. Thompson Ctr. Arms, 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2113 (1992) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
157. Justice O'Connor explicitly raised the issue of the applicability of the rule of lenity.
16 RICO L. Rep. at 930.
158. Thompson Ctr. Arms, 112 S. Ct. at 2102. The plurality opinion specified that they
applied the rule of lenity because the exact same statute and statutory language "has criminal
applications that carry no additional requirement of willfulness." Id. at 2109.
159. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1172 n.8 (1993).
160. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 29 (1983); see also United States v. Rivera,
884 F.2d 44, 546 (lth Cir. 1989) (rejecting criminal defendant's plea to construe narrowly
term "facilitate" of Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C. § 853(a)(2), relying on § 853(o) which is carbon copy of RICO liberal construction
clause. "The rule of lenity is merely a canon of statutory construction; it is inapplicable,
however, when, as here, a clear legislative directive to the contrary exists."); see also United
States v. Wake, 948 F.2d 1422 (5th Cir. 1991) (liberally interpreting "schoolyard" drug statute
as requiring only possession and not specific intent to distribute drugs in prohibited zone).
161. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 (1985).
162. Despite the broad scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes, courts have long held
that "[t]he elements of the [RICO] predicate offenses are well-defined and established." United
States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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did not realize that their conduct was criminal.163 These cases possibly reflect
the government's self-imposed limitation of criminal RICO to the more
egregious situations. In the private civil context, however, no institutional
restraint exists; due in large part to the open-ended vagueness of the mail
and wire fraud statutes, a civil plaintiff might succeed in imposing liability
in a situation that would be unfair surprise in the criminal context, thus
expanding the scope of possible future constitutional criminal applications.
This was the apparent concern of the D.C. Circuit in the Yellow Bus case
to which Judge Mikva concurred.164
The rule of lenity, therefore, is of little help in addressing the problems
created by RICO. Although it is indeed strange to argue for a narrow
construction of sections 1961 and 1962 in private civil cases and not in
criminal cases, the issue should be judged not by blind invocation of rules
of statutory construction but by a reasoned application of their rationale.
Different statutory purposes warrant different statutory interpretations. In
the very peculiar case of RICO, that means a narrow construction of the
statute for private civil cases brought under section 1964(c).
The most serious objection is that the purposes of the statute may not
be sufficiently different to warrant different treatment. It is not clear how
different the purposes must be. The Laffey court, for example, applied
different constructions, in part, because it found that a policy of punishment
was "completely foreign" to the purposes behind the civil provision. 65 Yet
in RICO, the desire to punish is not exactly foreign to the treble damages
award. The close modeling of the RICO provision to the Clayton Act was
not coincidental and the urge to model RICO after the anti-trust "private
attorney-general" model also points to a punitive purpose.
The first response to this objection is to point out the above legislative
history: the private civil provisions were an afterthought, added at the tail-
end of the legislative process. The tool Congress fashioned for government
prosecutors was meant to destroy Organized Crime, not Ernst & Young.
As Senator Hruska's remarks and the House committee minority report
clearly indicate, the additional tool Congress created in section 1964(c) for
certain private parties was meant to extract compensation for certain types
of damage. While the private civil provisions contain a punitive aspect, they
clearly have a much narrower purpose than the government-related provi-
sions. They have never worked as an aid to prosecutors.'6 The narrower
private civil purpose justifies a narrower private civil interpretation.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1104 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting
vagueness challenge and stating that as applied, this particular defendant was put sufficiently
on notice that multiple acts of murder and extortion would subject him to RICO penalties);
see also supra note 33 (discussing constitutional challenges to RICO statute).
164. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. y. Drivers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(en bane).
165. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
166. Rasmussen, supra note 55, at 633 (noting that RICO has not functioned as private
attorney general concept).
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The objection also misconceives how the doctrine might apply. While
the dual construction doctrine would work to separate private civil actions
from government actions, it would not necessarily cease there and construe
all issues that arise in the private civil cases narrowly. Rather, it could
apply at a second level. As in the director's liability statutes discussed above,
the dual construction doctrine could distinguish, within the context of the
private civil action, between penal and remedial aspects of RICO. The
statute would be narrowly interpreted when the issue concerns the liability
of the defendant and liberally construed when the issue involves the avail-
ability of the remedy to the plaintiff. This application would have the virtue
of being in complete accord with the Congressional command that the
statute be "liberally interpreted to effectuate its remedial purposes," to the
extent that clause applies to section 1964. It only adds the logical converse
that the statute should be conservatively interpreted to restrict its penal
purposes. Just as the "remedy must not be destroyed by the penalty,"' 67
so should the penalty not be exacerbated by the remedy.
One difficulty with this second-level application is that it may be hard
to distinguish "liability" issues from "remedial" issues. After all, every
extension of liability also helps "effectuate" a remedy and every restriction
of remedies also decreases someone's liability. How does one tell the
difference?
Although this difficulty is real, let me suggest one solution. One must
view the doctrine as a compromise, an exercise in line-drawing. Consider
how the issues arise. Plaintiff files suit. Defendant objects. Objections based
on reasons other than on the merits of the allegations will most likely be
best evaluated under a liberal construction of the statute. For example, if
the objection is one of standing, or statute of limitations, or assignment of
a claim, or some other procedural argument, the statute should be inter-
preted broadly so as to allow potential plaintiffs the opportunity to claim
a remedy. However, for objections that go to the merits of the case-such
as an objection that the behavior engaged in or alleged to have been engaged
in is not within the scope of the statute-a narrow construction will probably
be best. Under this approach, sections 1961 and 1962 would usually be
narrowly construed in private civil RICO cases because these issues almost
always directly concern the liability of the defendants. Likewise, issues
arising under section 1964(c) would normally be liberally decided, because
they almost always concern the ability of certain plaintiffs to seek the
remedy.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the dual construction doctrine
is merely a statutory rule of construction. Though I maintain that it is the
best rule to use with RICO, courts should use it only when confronted by
two reasonable constructions of the statute; obviously the plain meaning of
the statute or other rules of construction may obviate its use.
167. Newsom v. F.W. Poe Mfg. Co., 86 S.E. 195, 198 (S.C. 1915).
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C. Applying the Doctrine of Dual Construction to the Cases
Applying the construction doctrine to several RICO scenarios demon-
strates how it might work in practice. First, the proposed doctrine leads to
the same result as the Supreme Court arrived at in Reves, but not on the
implausible basis that section 1962(c) is "unambiguous." Justice Souter was
entirely correct that the provision is subject to more than one reasonable
construction. However, he was incorrect in looking no further than the
"liberal construction" clause for a tiebreaker. A liberal construction in
Reves would expand liability. Under the dual construction doctrine, given
the choice between two reasonable constructions of section 1962(c), a liability
provision, the Court should use the more restrictive one in the private civil
context. However, if this had been a criminal case, or a suit brought by
the government for injunctive relief, then the liberal construction should be
adopted. Under my proposed model, Reves provides no precedent for any
future criminal section 1962(c) case.
Likewise, the Court was correct in Turkette and Russello to broadly
construe sections 1961 and 1962 because the government brought those cases
and therefore the clear intent of Congress to write as broad a criminal
statute as the constitution would allow must be given full effect. However,
their interpretations would not necessarily provide precedent for private civil
cases. Recall that the Turkette court, in the criminal context, put the burden
on those who advocated a narrow interpretation to prove a limiting intent
in the legislative history, while the Reves court reversed the burden in a
civil case. While the term "enterprise" may include wholly illegitimate
entities for criminal purposes, the term may not have such a broad reach
for civil purposes.
6s
168. In this regard, consider National Organization for Women (NOW) v. Scheidler, 114
S. Ct. 798 (1994), where plaintiffs sued a coalition of antiabortion groups called the Pro-Life
Action Network (PLAN) under § 1962(c), alleging that the defendants were operating the
enterprise PLAN through a pattern of racketeering activity. The trial court dismissed the RICO
allegations under FED. R. Ctv. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground, inter alia, that plaintiffs had failed
to allege that the enterprise PLAN had any "profit generating purpose." NOW v. Scheidler,
765 F. Supp. 937, 943 (N.D. I11. 1991). Although affirmed by the court of appeals, NOW v.
Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), a unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that
no allegations of economic motive on the part of either the enterprise or defendants were
required. The Court rested its holding on the ground that "[wle believe the statutory language
is unambiguous." NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 806. "Nowhere is either § 1962(c), or in the RICO
definitions in § 1961, is there any indication that an economic motive is required." Id. at 804.
The Court refused to apply the rule of lenity because "[w]e simply do not think there is an
ambiguity here which would suffice to invoke the rule of lenity." Id. at 806. Presumably,
then, the Court would not consider the term "enterprise" sufficiently ambiguous to use any
other statutory rule of construction, including the dual construction rule.
Like the Turkette case, which the NOW opinion explicitly invokes in support of its
decisional method, the Court ultimately rests its decision on the presumption of expansion.
"The fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does
not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." Id. at 806 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985), which in turn was quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American
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Third, the dual construction doctrine suggests that Sedima, another civil
case, was also rightly decided in the same way Reves was rightly decided:
because it was construing the reach of section 1964(c), the remedy provision.
However, the H.J. decision's broad reading of the section 1962 term "pat-
tern" was incorrect in that case's civil context, though it might be correct
in a case brought by the government.
Fourth, the doctrine possibly solves some currently contested RICO
issues. For example, the circuits are considered split on the question of
whether the treble damages are punitive. 169 But this Article's analysis suggests
that this is the wrong question and under the dual construction approach
what appear to be contradictory opinions harmonize. As to the plaintiff,
damages are remedial. Thus, in Faircloth v. Finesod,70 the Fourth Circuit
held that private civil RICO claims do not abate upon the death of the
injured party because the "primary" purpose of the civil provisions was
remedial. 7 1 This was clearly a proper holding because it effectuated the
remedial purposes of the statute. It concerned the availability of
section 1964(c) to a class of potential plaintiffs. It is very much consistent
with the director liability cases and with the real estate compensation fund
cases, discussed above.
The Fourth Circuit's intuition that "civil RICO is a square peg, and
squeeze it as we may, it will never comfortably fit in the round holes of
the remedy/penalty dichotomy,"' 72 is well illustrated by the Third Circuit's
opinion in Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp. 3 There, the court refused to
allow a civil RICO count against a New Jersey township for the acts of its
agents, by applying the general rule that punitive damages will not lie
against a municipal corporation. 74 Again, this appears a proper holding
because it recognizes that, as to the defendant, treble damages are punitive,
and therefore narrowly construes defendant liability.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 382, 398 (7th Cir. 1984)). Thus, to this Court,
Congressional silence equals expansion. This appears inconsistent with the Reves court's view,
given in the text supra at note 97.
If one takes the equally reasonable view that Congressional silence in the statute on the
issue demonstrates nothing more than silence, then rules of statutory construction would apply.
Because this is a civil case and the issue is one of liability, then under the dual construction
approach, the presumption should be for the narrower of the possible interpretations and the
burden should be upon the plaintiffs to prove the propriety of a broad reading, either from
statutory language, structure, or history. This latter decisional method may lead to the same
outcome in the case, but it would be more sensitive to the complexity of the statute. Likewise,
reliance on Turkette, a criminal case, would not be allowed in this civil context. Thus, while
the term "enterprise" might well require an economic motive for private plaintiffs in civil
actions, such a requirement would not impede the federal government from using RICO to
prosecute, say, the World Trade Center bombers.
169. Gregory P. Joseph, Circuits In Disarray on Six Key Issues, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26,
1992, at 17, 22.
170. 938 F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1991).
171. Faircloth v. Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 1991).
172. Id.
173. 937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991).
174. Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 910-11 (3d Cir. 1991).
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Finally, my suggested approach would partly address the concern raised
among several commentators that civil RICO defendants should be allowed
certain constitutional procedural protections. 75 As Norman Abrams suc-
cinctly put it: "it is important to keep in mind that private civil RICO
involves direct enforcement in civil proceedings of the criminal law."' 7 6 By
severing criminal precedents from civil, a dual interpretive approach would
somewhat counterbalance defendants' lesser procedural protections with
stricter construction of liability. It would end the disturbing prospect of
civil cases providing precedent for criminal convictions. At the same time,
Professor Abrams's pithy reminder is not the entire story: as a mechanism
for the "victim" of the "crime" to extract compensation from the defen-
dant, civil RICO is remedial. Granting a RICO defendant the panoply of
criminal procedural protections ignores that aspect of the statute; the dual
construction doctrine does not.
In sum, the dual construction doctrine would be a principled way to
express the almost universal intuition of the lower federal courts that private
civil RICO should be restrained, without simultaneously reducing the sta-
tute's criminal scope and without violating Congress's liberal construction
clause. '7
CONCLUSION
Reading RICO requires one to face the fact that Congress drafted a
vague statute and has evidenced little inclination to clarify it. Although the
Court in Reves indicated that it was ready to depart from the expansionist
road built by Turkette, Sedima, and H.J., it did not move in any promising
direction. To deal with RICO's abundant ambiguities, courts should adopt
a doctrine of dual construction, resolving the ambiguities according to a
different and more restrictive standard in private civil cases than in cases
175. See, e.g., Joan Meier, The "Right" to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal
Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85 (1992); Note, Civil
RICO is a Misnomer: The Need For Criminal Procedural Protections in Actions Under 18
U.S.C. § 1964, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1288 (1987).
176. Abrams, supra note 47, at 5. Professor Abrams does not, at least in this article,
advocate criminal procedural protections for defendants. Rather, his faith in prosecutorial
discretion is so great that he proposes a statutory "system of prosecutorial review of private
civil RICO complaints. Under the proposed system, before a complaint can be pursued, it
must be approved by the office of criminal prosecution under the suggested standard." Id. at
8. Nothing in his article, however, suggests that Professor Abrams would be opposed to
criminal procedural protections.
177. Having a criminal statute of greater scope than its civil counterpart is far from a
novel concept in the law. An examination of the U.S. Code quickly shows that it is nothing
new for Congress to create a criminal statute which does not also provide the equivalent civil
remedy. For example, until RICO, although the mail and wire fraud statutes gave the
government extensive prosecutorial powers, they did not provide any private right of action
at all. Furthermore, in other contexts, RICO itself has been held to grant the government,
but not private plaintiffs, certain powers. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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where the government is either plaintiff or prosecutor. Reves thus represents
a missed opportunity-a road not taken.
